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FOREWORD
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE HEALTH
CARE & PRIVACY REGULATION AFTER
SORRELL V. IMS HEALTH
John M. Greabe*
One of the joys of teaching Conflict of Laws (yes, you read that
correctly) lies in introducing students to the surprising frequency with
which one can helpfully illuminate a difficult legal problem by framing it in
choice-of-law terms. Students often assume that the sole purpose of a
Conflict of Laws course is to canvass exotic jurisdiction-selecting rules that
decide which laws to apply to disputes arising from transactions or
occurrences with multistate dimensions. But upon being introduced to the
modem approaches to choice of law, students discover, often with great
satisfaction, that the topic is implicated whenever litigants asserting claims,
defenses, or other requests for relief disagree over which of two or more
mutually exclusive rules governs a given set of facts-even when the rules
vying for application issue from the same sovereign and the putative
conflict is therefore entirely "domestic."'
This point, although basic, conduces to an appreciation that a court
must employ a two-step process whenever it is required to choose between
or among rules that cannot simultaneously apply but have been proffered by
the parties as applicable. First, the court must determine whether it is
plausible, as a prima facie matter, that more than one of the proffered rules
* Professor, University of New Hampshire School of Law. I thank Jonathan Voegele and the
staff of the Vermont Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance. I also thank the staffs of the
University of New Hampshire Law Review and the Vermont Law Review, especially Jonathan Foskett,
Jonathan Voegele, Katie Polonsky, and Emily Steinhilber, for their tireless work in putting together a
first-class Symposium. Finally, I extend special thanks to the Symposium's keynote speaker, the
Honorable Jeffrey Howard of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and to its distinguished
panelists: Bridget Asay, Ash Bhagwat, Linda Cohen, Tom Julin, Michael Loucks, Steve Maier, Calvin
Massey, Abigail Moncrieff, Tamara Piety, Ted Ruger, Dr. Gary Sobelson, Representative Sharon Treat,
John Verdi, and Ernie Young.
1. The casebook from which I teach uses the case of Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), to
introduce this point. Marek raised the question whether attorney's fees incurred by a plaintiff subsequent
to a defendant's offer of settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 must be paid under 42
U.S.C. § 1988, which permits a prevailing civil rights plaintiff to recover attorney's fees, when the
plaintiff recovers a judgment less than the offer. Thus, the case put the Supreme Court to the choice of
applying one of two federal laws-either Rule 68 or § 1988. Judge Richard Posner, writing for a panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, concluded that the substantive purposes of § 1988
would be undermined by application of the necessarily procedural Rule 68 to the facts in question. See
Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983). But the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, reversed. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). The case is discussed in the excellent
Conflicts casebook, DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 117-22 (8th ed. 2010).
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could govern the facts in question. Second, if so, the court must apply
second-order rules or principles to choose between or among the potentially
applicable rules.2 When viewed in this way, the choice-of-law process
reveals itself as nothing more or less than an act of legal interpretationi.e., an act requiring analysis of multiple proffered rules of decision to see
whether they apply to authorize the relief requested or to immunize the
target of the claim. 3
Of course, this insight merely leads to the difficult heart of the matter:
How do we identify or formulate the second-order rules or principles that
must serve as the tiebreakers between or among rules that might plausibly,
but cannot simultaneously, govern a set of facts?4 Unfortunately, as readers
well know, courts sometimes fail to acknowledge that they confront
plausible but mutually exclusive options at this crucial point in the
decisional process. The inherent difficulty of choosing between or among
inconsistent laws that facially apply sometimes leads courts to succumb to
the temptation of manipulating the elements of legal reasoning so as to
simply place the operative facts into one outcome-determinative category or

2. Much of modem conflicts scholarship addresses what those second-order rules or
principles should be and how the choice between plausible but mutually exclusive rules should be made.
See infra notes 3-4.
3. In the case of a multistate choice-of-law problem, the proffered rules of decision issue from
different sovereigns simply because the operative facts happen to have multistate dimensions. But the
process of selecting the appropriate rule to apply mirrors the process used in the context of a domestic
choice-of-law dispute. See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 1, at 134 (crediting Professor Brainerd Currie with
the "central insight ... that the process of determining whether a state's law applies in a particular
multistate case 'is essentially the familiar one of construction or interpretation"' (quoting BRAINERD
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 178 (1963))). Currie and his coauthors
elaborate:
A complaint is filed alleging certain facts and claiming a right to relief. Whether
the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought depends on whether some rule of law so
provides-something the court determines by interpreting and applying the laws
proffered by the parties. According to [most modem choice-of-law theories], this
same process should be followed in multistate cases, only instead of asking
questions like whether the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent or
not acting within the scope of employment, we ask questions concerning spatial
elements of a claim, like whether the plaintiff must prove that he or she is from
the state or that the accident occurred there.
Id; see also id. at 135 n. I (observing that most-although not all-modem conflicts scholars agree "that
the first step in a [multistate] choice of law case should be to determine, in light of their underlying
purposes, which states' laws should be read to apply").
4. Modem conflicts scholars have proposed a number of approaches to answering this
question. See generally id. at 117-200 (discussing, inter alia, "interest analysis," the theory of
"comparative impairment," the "better law" theory, and the amalgam of approaches employed in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict ofLaws (1971)).
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another.s And the considerations informing that initial act of
characterization are left for the reader to infer, as the crucial choice that the
court has made serves (misleadingly) as the point of departure.
Consider, for example, First Amendment speech and association
jurisprudence. The doctrines that govern First Amendment disputes
frequently require judges to make ex ante categorizing decisions-e.g.,
whether the regulated conduct is sufficiently expressive or associational to
implicate the First Amendment, whether conduct that is expressive or
associational may nonetheless be regulated for non-speech-related reasons,'
whether a regulation of speech or expressive conduct should be treated as
content-based or content-neutral 8-- that dictate the level of scrutiny that is
to be applied to a regulation challenged as an unlawful abridgement of a
party's speech or associational rights. Typically, these ex ante
characterizations are outcome-determinative. But as any law student can
attest, courts writing First Amendment opinions often fail to discuss, or
sometimes even to acknowledge, the competing social background facts
and values that could plausibly ground an alternative (although mutually
exclusive) initial categorization. As a consequence, one is frequently left
with the impression that those with contending viewpoints in difficult First
Amendment cases are largely talking past one another.9
A problem of this sort may fairly be seen to lie at the root of the
disagreement between the majority and the dissenting opinions in Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc.,1o the Supreme Court decision that grounded the wonderful

5. 1 do not here use the word "manipulate" in a pejorative sense-even as I criticize the
practice of unexplained, ex ante categorization-because all legal reasoning requires manipulation of its
constituent elements. See generally LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON INLAW ch. I (8th
ed. 2010) (explaining how judges necessarily use their "fact freedom" and the inherently discretionary
power of characterization to combine the elements of legal reasoning-the case facts, the social
background facts, the rules of law, and moral values-to make "the choices that legal reasoning
confronts").
6. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (holding that an ordinance
licensing dance halls for minors on the condition that they limit admission to those between fourteen and
eighteen years old and restrict their hours of operation does not infringe on interests that the First
Amendment protects).
7. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding against a First
Amendment challenge a criminal conviction for burning a Selective Service registration certificate).
8. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a
facially content-based zoning restriction targeting adult theaters because of its content-neutral purpose of
regulating the non-speech-related "secondary effects" of such theaters).
9. Cf THIS IS SPINAL TAP (Embassy Pictures 1984) ("Well, it's one louder, isn't it?" (quoting
Nigel Tufnel and rejecting the suggestion that amplifiers with volume controls that go to eleven are not
necessarily louder than conventional amplifiers the volume controls of which max out at ten)).
10. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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Symposium that this volume of the Vermont Law Review commemorates."
InSorrell,the Supreme Court resolved a split between the First and Second
Circuits about the constitutionality of similar (although not identical) state
laws, enacted first in New Hampshire and subsequently in Maine and
Vermont, that sought to constrain health care costs by limiting the ability of
pharmaceutical companies to purchase from data-mining companies, and of
data-mining companies to purchase from pharmacies, information about the
prescription-writing patterns of the physicians to whom members of their
sales forces, known as "detailers," market newer drugs.12 The principal
theory animating these laws was that pharmaceutical companies were using
this "prescriber-identifiable" information to direct their marketing efforts
with precision at physicians who had track records of prescribing newer
drugs still protected by patents, and successfully persuading these
physicians to prescribe such drugs in circumstances where cheaper, offpatent generic drugs would be equally effective and perhaps safer. 3
In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down the Vermont law and
abrogated the New Hampshire and Maine laws that the First Circuit had
previously upheld. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded
that the law could not withstand the "heightened scrutiny" that the Court
was obligated to apply because of the discriminatory content- and speakerbased burdens on protected expression that the statute had imposed on those
who would use prescriber-identifiable data to market brand-name drugs.14

11. The Symposium was jointly sponsored by the University of New HampshireLaw Review
and the Vermont Law Review and was held at the University of New Hampshire School of Law on
October 14, 2011.
12. Perhaps appreciating that a direct regulation of the detailing process was likely to raise
significant First Amendment questions, the New Hampshire statute sought instead to regulate further
upstream by making it unlawful for pharmacies to sell to data-mining companies and for data-mining
companies to sell to pharmaceutical companies "prescriber-identifiable data. . . for any commercial
purpose." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2011); see also IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42
(1st Cir. 2008), abrogatedby Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2653. The Maine and Vermont statutes also regulated
upstream, but did so in different ways. The Maine statute provided regulatory proscriptions similar to
the New Hampshire statute, but only for those prescription writers who "opted in" to the protections
conferred by the statutory scheme. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711 -E(2-A) (2007); see also
IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010), abrogated by Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2653. The
Vermont statute, by contrast, presumptively applied unless a prescription writer "opted out" of the
statutory scheme by consenting to have his or her prescription-writing information sold. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(d) (2007); see also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2653. Moreover, the Vermont statute also
directly prohibited pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber-identifiable information for
purposes of detailing absent the prescription writer's consent. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d); see
also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.
13. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661.
14. See id. at 2661-67. The majority opinion highlighted the discriminatory nature of the law
in question by emphasizing that its limitations did not limit the ability of other speakers to acquire
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In so ruling, the majority rejected Vermont's attempts to justify the statute
in terms of its interests in medical privacy, physician confidentiality,
avoidance of harassment, the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship,
improving public health, or reducing health care costs.15 And it brushed
aside Vermont's arguments, embraced by Justice Breyer in dissent (joined
by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan), that the statute was a permissible
commercial regulation of a sort that had never previously been subjected to
heightened First Amendment scrutiny at all or, alternatively, had only been
subjected to the rather forgiving "intermediate" scrutiny applied to
commercial speech.16 To the majority, the content- and speaker-based
burdens imposed by the Vermont statute made it obvious, ex ante, that a
heightened form of First Amendment scrutiny should apply.' But to the
dissent, the fact that the Vermont statute was a regulation of commerce
similar to a number of other modern commercial measures regulating the
transfer, sale, or use of information and data-and that it "adversely
affect[ed] expression in one, and only one, way"-made it just as obvious,
ex ante, that the measure did not warrant the careful scrutiny employed by
the majority. 8
The Sorrell decision is extremely involved and topically rich. As the
excellent papers in this book demonstrate, the decision exposes emergent
fault lines in the Supreme Court's relaxed approach towards legislative
infringements of economic interests but assertive enforcement of individual
rights-a phenomenon that has been dubbed the "constitutional double
standard." 9 The decision also could have very significant implications for
federal and state health care regulation,20 federal and state privacy
regulation, 2' and federal and state laws that burden commercial speech,

prescriber-identifying information for speech-related purposes other than the marketing of brand-name
drugs. See id. at 2663.
15. See id. at 2667-72.
16. See id. at 2664-67.
17. See id. at 2661-67.
18. Id. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. See infra Ernest A. Young, Sorrell v. IMS Health and the End ofthe ConstitutionalDouble
Standard,36 VT. L. REv. 903 (2012) (crediting Henry J. Abraham & Barbara A. Perry, Freedomand the
Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States (8th ed. 2003), for the phrase "constitutional
double standard").
20. See id.
21. See infra Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of
Privacy, 36 VT. L. REv. 855 (2012); Thomas R. Julin, Jamie Z. Isani & Patricia Acosta, The Dog Thai
Did Bark: First Amendment Protection of Data Mining, 36 VT. L. REV. 881 (2012) (responding to
Professor Bhagwat); and Christopher R. Smith, Somebody's Watching Me: ProtectingPatient Privacy in
PrescriptionHealth Information, 36 VT. L. REv. 931 (2012).
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expressive conduct, and the transmission of information.2 2 Readers should
constantly bear in mind, however, that all of these issues sit on top of, and
trace back to, a "domestic" choice-of-law problem of the sort described
above: a fundamental disagreement about the constitutional default rule that
should apply to regulations which limit the sale, transfer, or use of data and
commercial information.
The specific issue is this: Should the default rule that the Supreme
Court has applied to commercial regulation since 1937-i.e., that such laws
enjoy a presumption of constitutionality and are to be reviewed only for
rationality 23-also apply to the many regulatory provisions that might be
seen to limit the freedom of economic actors to engage in conduct that
involves the sale, transfer, or use of data or information? 24 Or should there
be a "narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality"
for such provisions precisely because, one plausibly can contend, they
engage in content discrimination and therefore "appear[] on their face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution?" 2 5 And more generally, do
widely shared assumptions about the folly of the Supreme Court's conduct
during the Lochner era helpfully illuminate this modem constitutional and
regulatory dispute? 26 Or do charged invocations of Lochner serve in this
context only to generate more heat than light?
These are questions of fundamental importance that deserve a more
extended airing than the majority and dissenting opinions in the Sorrell
22. See infra Calvin Massey, Uncensored DiscourseIs Not Just for Politics, 36 VT. L. REV.
845 (2012).
23. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
24. Justice Breyer provides a number of examples of regulation that he describes as similar to
Vermont's law (in terms of regulating on the basis of content and regulating particular speakers) but that
never before have been subjected to heightened scrutiny of the sort employed by the majority:
Electricity regulators, for example, oversee company statements, pronouncements
and proposals, but only about electricity. The Federal Reserve Board regulates the
content of statements, advertising, loan proposals, and interest rate disclosures,
but only when made by financial institutions. And the [Food and Drug
Administration] oversees the form and content of labeling, advertising, and sales
proposals of drugs, but not furniture.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2677 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
25. CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
26. Compare Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority's
application of heightened First Amendment scrutiny to a regulation of commercial activities of the sort
worked by the Vermont statute recalls "a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for its
interference with economic liberty" when the power of judicial review "was much abused and resulted
in the constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual jurists" (citing Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting))), with Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665 (majority
opinion) (responding to Justice Breyer by observing that while the "Constitution 'does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics[,]' [i]t does enact the First Amendment" (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at
75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted))).
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decision provide. Indeed, these questions merit careful consideration as part
of the broader discussion of corporate constitutional rights that has been
taking place ever since the Supreme Court decided, in the context of
campaign-finance reform, that corporations enjoy full First Amendment
protections.27 I am certain that readers will find the papers and remarks that
follow to be extremely valuable contributions as we consider these
questions and press to new frontiers the ongoing national conversations
about whether and how the Constitution limits federal and state regulatory
power and the role that the Supreme Court should play in enforcing
constitutional limits.

27. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding in the course
of evaluating the constitutionality of campaign-finance regulation that a corporate speaker is entitled to
the same protections under the First Amendment as an individual speaker). Even though the Sorrell
decision did not discuss, or even cite, Citizens United, a number of commentators have seen important
points of intersection between the two cases. See, e.g., David Gans, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Corporate
Commercial Speech in the Age of Citizens United, BALKINIZATION (June 23, 2011, 6:33 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/sorrell-v-ims-health-corporate.html;
Katie Booth, The All-orNothing Approach to Data Privacy: Sorrell v. IMS Health, Citizens United, and the Futureof Online
Data Privacy Legislation, JOLT DIGEST (Aug. 17, 2011), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy/theall-or-nothing-approach-to-data-privacy-sorrell-v-ims-health-citizens-united-and-the-future-of-onlinedata-privacy-legislation.

